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The Supreme Court of South Carolina 
In the Matter of Anne Mahoney, Petitioner 
 
Appellate Case No. 2016-001378 
ORDER 
Petitioner is currently admitted to practice law in South Carolina, and has now 
submitted a resignation under Rule 409 of the South Carolina Appellate Court 
Rules. The resignation is accepted. 
 
If petitioner is currently representing any South Carolina clients, petitioner shall 
immediately notify those clients of the resignation by certified mail, return receipt 
requested. Further, if petitioner is currently counsel of record before any court of 
this State, petitioner shall immediately move to be relieved as counsel in that 
matter. 
 
Within twenty (20) days of the date of this order, petitioner shall: 
 
(1)   surrender the certificate of admission to the Clerk of this Court.  If 
petitioner cannot locate this certificate, petitioner shall provide the Clerk with an 
affidavit indicating this fact and indicating that the certificate will be immediately 
surrendered if it is subsequently located. 
 
(2)   provide an affidavit to the Clerk of this Court showing that petitioner has 
fully complied with the requirements of this order. 
 
s/ Costa M. Pleicones  C.J. 
 
s/ Donald W. Beatty  J. 
 
s/ John W. Kittredge  J. 
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 s/ Kaye G. Hearn  J. 
 
s/ John Cannon Few  J. 
 
 
Columbia, South Carolina 
 
August 4, 2016 
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THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 
In The Supreme Court 
Jane Roe, as parent and natural guardian of Judy Roe, 
James Roe, and Joyce Roe, Minor Children Under the 
Age of Eighteen, (18), Petitioners, 
v. 
Daniel Bibby Sr. and Michelle Bibby, Defendants, 
of Whom Michelle Bibby is the Respondent. 
Appellate Case No. 2014-002500 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Appeal From Berkeley County 
R. Markley Dennis, Jr., Circuit Court Judge 
Opinion No. 27652 
Heard November 5, 2015 – Filed August 10, 2016 
DISMISSED AS IMPROVIDENTLY GRANTED 
Eric M. Poulin, of Anastopoulo Law Firm, LLC, of 
Charleston, for Petitioners. 
Eugene P. Corrigan, III and J.W. Nelson Chandler, both
of Corrigan & Chandler, LLC, of Charleston, for 
Respondent. 
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PER CURIAM: We granted certiorari to review the court of appeals' decision in 
Roe v. Bibby, 410 S.C. 287, 763 S.E.2d 645 (Ct. App. 2014). We now dismiss the
writ as improvidently granted.  
DISMISSED AS IMPROVIDENTLY GRANTED.  
PLEICONES, C.J., BEATTY, KITTREDGE, HEARN, JJ., and Acting Justice 
Jean H. Toal, concur. 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
                                        
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Supreme Court 

In the Matter of Justin J. Trapp, Respondent. 
Appellate Case No. 2016-001076 
Opinion No. 27653 

Submitted July 19, 2016 – Filed August 10, 2016 

DEFINITE SUSPENSION 
Disciplinary Counsel Lesley M. Coggiola and Senior 
Assistant Disciplinary Counsel C. Tex Davis, Jr. for  
Office of Disciplinary Counsel. 
Justin J. Trap, Pro Se. 
PER CURIAM: In this attorney disciplinary matter, respondent and the Office 
of Disciplinary Counsel (ODC) have entered into an Agreement for Discipline by 
Consent (Agreement) pursuant to Rule 21 of the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary 
Enforcement (RLDE) contained in Rule 413 of the South Carolina Appellate Court 
Rules (SCACR). In the Agreement, respondent admits misconduct and consents to 
a definite suspension not to exceed three years, with the conditions that within 
thirty days of imposition of discipline, respondent shall pay the costs incurred by 
ODC and the Commission on Lawyer Conduct in investigating and prosecuting 
this matter ($113.70), and prior to reinstatement, complete the Legal Ethics and 
Practice Program's Ethics School, Trust Account School, and Advertising School.  
Respondent requests that the suspension be made retroactive to the date of interim
suspension.1  We accept the Agreement and suspend respondent from the practice 
1 Respondent was placed on interim suspension by order dated September 25, 2014.  In re Trapp, 
410 S.C. 151, 763 S.E.2d 811 (2014). 
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of law in this state for one year, retroactive to the date of his interim suspension, 
subject to the conditions set forth in the Agreement.   
Facts 
The allegations set forth in the Formal Charges, which have been incorporated into 
the Agreement, are as follows.  Respondent, who was admitted to the South 
Carolina Bar in 2009, was appointed in 2012 to represent an applicant in a post-
conviction relief matter. The Attorney General's Office mailed various pleadings 
and other correspondence to respondent at the address respondent provided in the 
Attorney Information System (AIS).  None of the correspondence was returned, 
nor did respondent make any response.  On April 14, 2014, the Attorney General's 
Office notified respondent that the applicant's case was on the roster for the 
upcoming term of court.  Respondent informed the Attorney General's Office that
he was not admitted to the South Carolina Bar and did not practice law.2  New 
counsel was appointed for the applicant. 
On May 14, 2014, ODC informed respondent by way of Notice of Investigation 
that it was investigating his conduct in connection with the applicant's case and that 
he was required to submit a written response within fifteen days.  The notice was 
mailed to the address respondent provided in AIS, but respondent failed to respond 
as required. On June 6, 2014, ODC sent respondent a letter pursuant to In the Matter 
of Treacy, 277 S.C. 514, 290 S.E.2d 240 (1982), again requesting a response and 
notifying him that failure to respond to ODC was, in and of itself, a separate 
ground for discipline. However, respondent failed to respond to the Treacy letter.  
On August 14, 2014, ODC served respondent with a Notice to Appear pursuant to  
Rule 19, RLDE, to answer questions on the record and under oath.  The notice was
served on respondent by mail at the address respondent provided in AIS.  
Respondent failed to appear, after which ODC filed a Petition for Interim
Suspension. As noted earlier, respondent was placed on interim suspension on 
September 25, 2014.  The order and a letter from the Clerk of Court directing 
respondent's attention to the requirements of Rule 30, RLDE, and specifically 
noting the affidavit required by Rule 30(i), RLDE, had to be filed within fifteen 
2Respondent had been placed on administrative suspension by orders of this Court dated March 
14, 2014, and April 25, 2014, for failure to pay license fees and failure to comply with 
continuing legal education requirements, respectively. 
19 

  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
                                        
days, was eventually served on respondent by SLED.  Respondent never filed an 
affidavit. 
Law 
Respondent admits that by his conduct he has violated the following Rules of 
Professional Conduct, Rule 407, SCACR: Rule 8.1(b) (a lawyer in connection with 
a disciplinary matter shall not knowingly fail to respond to a lawful demand for 
information from a disciplinary authority); Rule 8.4(d) (it is professional 
misconduct for a lawyer to engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit 
or misrepresentation); Rule 8.4(e) (it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to 
engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice). 
Respondent also admits his conduct constitutes grounds for discipline under Rule  
7(a)(1), (3), (5), (6), and (7), RLDE.3 
Conclusion 
We accept the Agreement for Discipline by Consent and suspend respondent from
the practice of law in this state for one year, retroactive to the date of his interim
suspension. Respondent shall also comply with the conditions set forth in the 
Agreement and noted in the first paragraph of this opinion.  Within fifteen (15) 
days of the date of this opinion, respondent shall file an affidavit with the Clerk of 
Court showing that he has complied with Rule 30 of Rule 413, SCACR, and shall 
also surrender his Certificate of Admission to the Practice of Law to the Clerk of 
Court. 
3 These provisions set forth the following grounds for discipline: violating or attempting to 
violate the Rules of Professional Conduct or any other rules of this jurisdiction regarding 
professional conduct of lawyers; willfully violating a valid order of the Supreme Court, 
Commission or panels of the Commission in a proceeding under these rules, willfully failing to 
appear personally as directed, willfully failing to comply with a subpoena issued under these 
rules, or knowingly failing to respond to a lawful demand from a disciplinary authority, to 
include a request for a response or appearance under Rule 19(b)(1), (c)(3) or (c)(4); engaging in 
conduct tending to pollute the administration of justice or to bring the courts or the legal 
profession into disrepute or conduct demonstrating an unfitness to practice law; violating the 
Lawyer's Oath contained in Rule 402(k), SCACR; and willfully violating a valid court order 
issued by a court of this state or of another jurisdiction. 
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DEFINITE SUSPENSION. 

PLEICONES, C.J., BEATTY, KITTREDGE, HEARN and FEW, JJ., concur.
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The Supreme Court of South Carolina
  
In the Matter of the Application of Alison Collins Ard, 
Respondent. 
 
Appellate Case No. 2012-211960 
ORDER 
This matter is before the Court for the imposition of a sanction as the result of 
respondent's admitted violation of this Court's August 24, 2012, order, and of the 
terms of her monitoring contract.  We find that respondent's misconduct warrants 
the imposition of a ninety (90) day suspension from the practice of law and, 
accordingly, suspend her from the practice of law in this state for ninety (90) days.  
Further, we order respondent to execute a new monitoring contract with Lawyers 
Helping Lawyers within twenty (20) days of the date of this order.  The new 
contract shall be for a period of nine (9) months and shall contain the same terms 
as provided in her original contract.  Respondent shall file a copy of the newly-
executed contract with the Clerk of this Court and with the Commission on Lawyer 
Conduct within thirty (30) days of the date of this order.    
Within fifteen (15) days of the date of this order, respondent shall file an affidavit 
with the Clerk of Court showing that she has complied with Rule 30 of the Rules 
for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement (RLDE) contained in Rule 413 of the South 
Carolina Appellate Court Rules (SCACR).1 
1 Any petition for reinstatement shall be filed in accordance with the provisions of 
Rule 32, RLDE. 
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This order shall be public.  
    
s/ Costa M. Pleicones  C.J. 
 
s/ Donald W. Beatty  J. 
 
s/ John W. Kittredge  J. 
 
s/ Kaye G. Hearn  J. 
 
s/ John Cannon Few  J. 
 
 
Columbia, South Carolina 
 
August 4, 2016 
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The Supreme Court of South Carolina
  
In the Matter of William Jefferson McMillian, III, 
Petitioner. 
 
Appellate Case No. 2015-001163 
ORDER 
By opinion dated June 26, 2013, the Court definitely suspended petitioner from the 
practice of law for three (3) years, retroactive to February 22, 2013, the date of his 
interim suspension.   In the Matter of McMillian, 404 S.C. 117, 744 S.E.2d 579 
(2013). Petitioner has now filed a Petition for Reinstatement pursuant to Rule 33 
of the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement contained in Rule 413 of the 
South Carolina Appellate Court Rules (SCACR).   
 
After thorough consideration of the entire record, the Court grants the Petition for 
Reinstatement. 
s/ Costa M. Pleicones  C.J. 
 
s/ Donald W. Beatty  J. 
 
s/ Kaye G. Hearn  J. 
 
We would deny the Petition for Reinstatement.   
 
s/ John W. Kittredge  J. 
 
s/ John Cannon Few  J. 
 
Columbia, South Carolina 
 
August 4, 2016 
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The Supreme Court of South Carolina
  
Re: Expansion of Electronic Filing Pilot Program - Court of 
Common Pleas 
 
Appellate Case No. 2015-002439 
ORDER
Pursuant to the provisions of Article V, Section 4 of the South Carolina Constitution, 
 
IT IS ORDERED that the Pilot Program for the Electronic Filing (E-Filing) of 
documents in the Court of Common Pleas, which was established by Order dated 
December 1, 2015, is expanded to include Spartanburg County.  Effective August 23, 
2016, all filings in all common pleas cases commenced or pending in Spartanburg 
County must be E-Filed if the party is represented by an attorney, unless the type of 
case or the type of filing is excluded from the Pilot Program.  The counties currently 
designated for mandatory E-Filing are as follows:   
 
Clarendon  Lee  Greenville 
Sumter  Williamsburg  Pickens 
Spartanburg—Effective August 23, 2016.  
 
Attorneys should refer to the South Carolina Electronic Filing Policies and 
Guidelines, which were adopted by the Supreme Court on October 28, 2015, and the 
training materials available at http://www.sccourts.org/efiling/ to determine whether 
any specific filings are exempted from the requirement that they be E-Filed.  
Attorneys who have cases pending in Pilot Counties are strongly encouraged to 
review, and to instruct their staff to review, the training materials available on the E-
Filing Portal. 
s/Costa M. Pleicones   
Costa M. Pleicones 
Chief Justice of South Carolina 
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  Columbia, South Carolina
August 8, 2016 
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The Supreme Court of South Carolina
  
Re: Amendments to Rule 411, South Carolina Appellate 
Court Rules. 
 
Appellate Case No. 2016-001218 and 2016-001219 
ORDER 
The South Carolina Bar has proposed several amendments to Rule 411, SCACR, 
which governs the Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection. The Bar also requests the 
Court approve a change to the Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection of the South 
Carolina Bar Rules of Procedure.   
We grant the Bar's request to amend Rule 411(d)(1) to reduce the Lawyers' Fund 
assessment for all regular members from $50 per year to $30 per year, and to 
amend Rule 411(b) to reduce the terms of service for members of the Lawyers' 
Fund for Client Protection Committee from five years to three years. We deny the 
Bar's request to amend the Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection of the South 
Carolina Bar Rules of Procedure. 
These amendments are effective immediately.   
s/ Costa M. Pleicones C.J. 
s/ Donald W. Beatty J. 
s/ John W. Kittredge J. 
s/ Kaye G. Hearn J. 
s/ John Cannon Few J. 
Columbia, South Carolina 
August 10, 2016 
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The Supreme Court of South Carolina
  
Re: Amendments to the South Carolina Electronic Filing 
Policies and Guidelines; Pilot Version-Common Pleas 
 
Appellate Case No. 2015-001532 
ORDER 
Pursuant to Art. V, § 4 of the South Carolina Constitution, we adopt the attached 
amendments to Section 2 of the South Carolina Electronic Filing Policies and 
Guidelines. We also amend the Certificate of Technical Failure/Difficulty Form.
These amendments alter Section 2(d) of the Policies and Guidelines to provide for 
an exemption from mandatory E-Filing where the defendant, rather than the 
plaintiff, initiates a new case as a minor settlement or death settlement.  We further 
amend Section 2(d) of the Policies and Guidelines and the Technical 
Failure/Difficulty Form to provide that, whenever a party seeks to Traditionally 
file a document pursuant to one of the exemptions listed in Section 2(d), the party 
must also submit a Technical Failure/Difficulty Form explaining the claimed 
exemption. These amendments are effective immediately.     
s/ Costa M. Pleicones C.J. 
s/ Donald W. Beatty J. 
s/ John W. Kittredge J. 
s/ Kaye G. Hearn J. 
s/ John Cannon Few J. 
Columbia, South Carolina 
August 10, 2016 
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Section 2(d) of the South Carolina Electronic Filing Policies and Guidelines is 
amended to provide: 
 
(d) Excluded Documents. The following documents may not be E-
Filed, regardless of whether the filer is an attorney, and must be 
Traditionally filed together with a Certificate of Technical Difficulty: 
 
(1) A motion to quash a subpoena filed by or on behalf of a 
non-party; 
 
(2) A motion that may be filed ex parte in an existing case; 
 
(3) Any other pleadings filed by or on behalf of a person or 
entity who is not a party to an existing case, other than motions 
to intervene or filings by a person or entity granted intervenor 
status; 
 
(4) A filing that initiates a new case and exceeds 40 Megabytes 
when converted to PDF; 
(5) Settlements filed as new cases, including Minor Settlement 
and Death Settlement Proceedings, if initiated and filed by the 
defendant, rather than the plaintiff. 
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The Supreme Court of South Carolina 
Re: Amendments to Rule 407, South Carolina Appellate 
Court Rules 
 
Appellate Case No. 2015-002035 
ORDER 
The South Carolina Bar has proposed a number of amendments to the South 
Carolina Rules of Professional Conduct, which are contained in Rule 407, SCACR.  
The Bar requests the Court adopt modified versions of the American Bar 
Association's Commission on Ethics 20/20 revisions to the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct.  These amendments to the Model Rules recognize that 
technological advances have affected various obligations of lawyers related to 
advertising and solicitation. 
We grant the Bar's request and amend Rules 1.4; 5.5, 7.1; 7.2; and 7.3, RPC, Rule 
407, SCACR, with some modifications.  We decline to adopt the Bar's proposal to 
amend Rule 1.0, RPC, Rule 407, SCACR, and have instead included the Bar's 
suggested language within the Comments to Rule 7.3.  The amendments, which are 
set forth in the attachment to this Order, are effective immediately.   
s/ Costa M. Pleicones C.J. 
s/ Donald W. Beatty J. 
s/ John W. Kittredge J. 
s/ Kaye G. Hearn J. 
s/ John Cannon Few J. 
Columbia, South Carolina 
August 10, 2016 
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Comment 4 to Rule 1.4, RPC, Rule 407, SCACR, is amended to provide: 
[4] A lawyer's regular communication with clients will minimize the 
occasions on which a client will need to request information 
concerning the representation. When a client makes a reasonable
request for information, however, paragraph (a)(4) requires prompt
compliance with the request, or if a prompt response is not feasible, 
that the lawyer, or a member of the lawyer's staff, acknowledge
receipt of the request and advise the client when a response may be 
expected. A lawyer should promptly respond to or acknowledge client 
communications.   
Comment 21 to Rule 5.5, RPC, Rule 407, SCACR, is amended to provide: 
[21] Paragraphs (c) and (d) do not authorize communications 
advertising legal services in this jurisdiction by lawyers who are 
admitted to practice in other jurisdictions. Whether and how lawyers 
may communicate the availability of their services in this jurisdiction 
is governed by Rules 7.1 to 7.5. 
Comment 3 to Rule 7.1, RPC, Rule 407, SCACR, is amended to provide: 
[3] An advertisement that truthfully reports a lawyer's achievements 
on behalf of clients or former clients may be misleading if presented 
so as to lead a reasonable person to form an unjustified expectation 
that the same results could be obtained for other clients in similar 
matters without reference to the specific factual and legal 
circumstances of each client's case. Similarly, an unsubstantiated 
comparison of the lawyer's services or fees with the services or fees of 
other lawyers may be misleading if presented with such specificity as 
would lead a reasonable person to conclude that the comparison can 
be substantiated. The inclusion of an appropriate disclaimer or
qualifying language may preclude a finding that a statement is likely 
to create unjustified expectations or otherwise mislead the public. 
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Comments 1, 2, 3, and 4 to Rule 7.2, RPC, Rule 407, SCACR, are amended to 
provide: 
[1] To assist the public in learning about and obtaining legal services, 
lawyers should be allowed to make known their services not only
through reputation but also through organized information campaigns 
in the form of advertising. Advertising involves an active quest for 
clients, contrary to the tradition that a lawyer should not seek 
clientele. However, the public's need to know about legal services can 
be fulfilled in part through advertising. This need is particularly acute 
in the case of persons of moderate means who have not made 
extensive use of legal services. The interest in expanding public 
information about legal services ought to prevail over considerations 
of tradition. Nevertheless, advertising by lawyers entails the risk of 
practices that are misleading or overreaching.
[2] This Rule permits public dissemination of information concerning 
a lawyer's name or firm name, address, email address, website, and 
telephone number; the kinds of services the lawyer will undertake; the 
basis on which the lawyer's fees are determined, including prices for 
specific services and payment and credit arrangements; a lawyer's
foreign language ability; names of references and, with their consent, 
names of clients regularly represented; and other information that 
might invite the attention of those seeking legal assistance. 
[3] Questions of effectiveness and taste in advertising are matters of 
speculation and subjective judgment. Some jurisdictions have had 
extensive prohibitions against television and other forms of 
advertising, against advertising going beyond specified facts about a 
lawyer, or against "undignified" advertising. Television, the Internet, 
and other forms of electronic communication are now among the most 
powerful media for getting information to the public, particularly 
persons of low and moderate income; prohibiting television, Internet, 
and other forms of electronic advertising, therefore, would impede the 
flow of information about legal services to many sectors of the public. 
Limiting the information that may be advertised has a similar effect 
and assumes that the bar can accurately forecast the kind of 
information that the public would regard as relevant. But see Rule 
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7.3(a) for the prohibition against a solicitation through a real time 
electronic exchange initiated by the lawyer. 
[4] Regardless of medium, a lawyer's advertisement should provide 
only useful, factual information presented in an objective and 
understandable fashion so as to facilitate a person's ability to make an 
informed choice about legal representation. A lawyer should strive to
communicate such information without the use of techniques intended 
solely to gain attention and which demonstrate a clear and intentional 
lack of relevance to the selection of counsel, as such techniques hinder 
rather than facilitate intelligent selection of counsel. A lawyer's 
advertisement should reflect the serious purpose of legal services and 
our judicial system. The state has a significant interest in protecting 
against a public loss of confidence in the legal system, including its 
participants, and in protecting specifically against harm to the jury 
system that might be caused by lawyer advertising. The effectiveness 
of the legal system depends upon the public's trust that the legal
system will operate with fairness and justice. Public trust is likely to 
be diminished if the public believes that some participants are able to 
obtain results through inappropriate methods. Public confidence also 
is likely to be diminished if the public perceives that the personality of 
their advocate, rather than the legal merit of their claim, is a key factor 
in determining the outcome of their matter. It is necessary to ensure 
that lawyer advertisements do not have these detrimental impacts. 
This rule is intended to preserve the public's access to information 
relevant to the selection of counsel, while limiting those advertising 
methods that are most likely to have a harmful impact on public
confidence in the legal system and which are of little or no benefit to 
the potential client. 
Comments 7, 8, and 9 to Rule 7.2, RPC, Rule 407, SCACR, are amended to 
provide:
[7] Except as permitted under paragraphs (c)(1)-(c)(3), lawyers are not 
permitted to pay others for recommending the lawyer's services or for 
channeling professional work in a manner that violates Rule 7.3. A 
communication contains a recommendation if it endorses or vouches 
for a lawyer's credentials, abilities, competence, character, or other 
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professional qualities. Paragraph (c)(1), however, allows a lawyer to 
pay for advertising and communications permitted by this Rule, 
including the cost of print directory listings, on-line directory listings, 
newspaper ads, television and radio airtime, domain-name
registrations, sponsorship fees, Internet-based advertisements, and 
group advertising. A lawyer may compensate employees, agents and 
vendors who are engaged to provide marketing or client-development 
services, such as publicists, public relations personnel, business 
development staff and website designers. Moreover, a lawyer may pay 
others for generating client leads, such as Internet-based client leads, 
as long as the lead generator does not recommend the lawyer, any 
payment to the lead generator is consistent with Rules 1.5(e) (division 
of fees) and 5.4 (professional independence of the lawyer), and the 
lead generator's communications are consistent with Rule 7.1 
(communications concerning a lawyer's services). To comply with
Rule 7.1, a lawyer must not pay a lead generator that states, implies, 
or creates a reasonable impression that it is recommending the lawyer, 
is making the referral without payment from the lawyer, or has 
analyzed a person's legal problems when determining which lawyer 
should receive the referral. See also Rule 5.3 (duties of lawyers and 
law firms with respect to the conduct of nonlawyers who prepare
marketing materials for them); Rule 8.4(a) (duty to avoid violating the 
Rules through the acts of another). 
[8] A lawyer may pay the usual charges of a legal service plan or a 
not-for-profit lawyer referral service, which is itself not acting in 
violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct. A legal service plan is 
a prepaid or group legal service plan or a similar delivery system that
assists people who seek to secure legal representation. A lawyer 
referral service, on the other hand, is any organization that holds itself 
out to the public as a lawyer referral service. Such referral services are
understood by the public to be consumer-oriented organizations that 
provide unbiased referrals to lawyers with appropriate experience in 
the subject matter of the representation and afford other client 
protections, such as complaint procedures or malpractice insurance 
requirements. Consequently, this Rule only permits a lawyer to pay 
the usual charges of a not-for-profit lawyer referral service. The 
"usual charges" may include a portion of legal fees collected by a 
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 lawyer from clients referred by the service when that portion of fees is 
collected to support the expenses projected for the referral service. 
 
[9] A lawyer who accepts assignments or referrals from a legal service 
plan or referrals from a lawyer referral service must act reasonably to 
assure that the activities of the plan or service are compatible with the 
lawyer's professional obligations. See Rule 5.3.  Legal service plans 
and lawyer referral services may communicate with the public, but 
such communication must be in conformity with these Rules. Thus, 
advertising must not be false or misleading, as would be the case if the 
communications of a group advertising program or a group legal 
services plan would mislead the public to think that it was a lawyer 
referral service sponsored by a state agency or bar association. See 
also Rule 7.3(b). 
 
New Comment 10 is added to Rule 7.2, Rule 407, SCACR, and provides: 
 
[10] Paragraph (d) is intended to work in conjunction with paragraph 
(b) to provide accountability for the content of lawyer advertising. It 
applies only to communications that contain substantive advertising or 
soliciting statements and inferences beyond a lawyer or law firm's 
mere name, design logo, and ordinary contact information. Thus 
lawyers may advertise through promotional items, such as pens, 
clothing, coffee mugs, and signage without the need for the name and 
address of an individual lawyer responsible for the materials, provided 
that such items or signage contain nothing other than the firm name, 
logo, and contact information; that any logo is merely a design shape 
and not a depiction; and that any included contact information does 
not contain a tagline or slogan. Any depiction (such as an animal, 
hammer, or other recognizable thing) within a logo triggers the 
requirement of paragraph (d), as does any slogan, tagline, or logo 
whether used as a part of contact information (e.g., 
www.sclawyer.com or 1-800-SC-LAWYER) or otherwise. 
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Rule 7.3, RPC, Rule 407, SCACR, is amended to provide: 
RULE 7.3: SOLICITATION OF CLIENTS 
(a) A lawyer shall not by in person, live telephone or real time 
electronic contact solicit professional employment when a significant 
motive for the lawyer's doing so is the lawyer's pecuniary gain, unless 
the person contacted: 
(1) is a lawyer; or 
(2) has a family, close personal, or prior professional 
relationship with the lawyer. 
(b) A lawyer shall not solicit professional employment by direct 
written, recorded or electronic communication or by in person, 
telephone, telegraph, facsimile or real time electronic contact even 
when not otherwise prohibited by paragraph (a), if: 
(1) the target of the solicitation has made known to the lawyer a 
desire not to be solicited by the lawyer; 
(2) the solicitation involves coercion, duress, harassment, fraud, 
overreaching, intimidation or undue influence; 
(3) the solicitation concerns an action for personal injury or 
wrongful death or otherwise relates to an accident or disaster 
involving the person solicited or a relative of that person unless 
the accident or disaster occurred more than thirty (30) days 
prior to the solicitation; 
(4) the solicitation concerns a specific matter and the lawyer 
knows, or reasonably should know, that the person solicited is 
represented by a lawyer in the matter; or 
(5) the lawyer knows, or reasonably should know, that the 
physical, emotional, or mental state of the person makes it 
unlikely that the person would exercise reasonable judgment in 
employing a lawyer. 
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(c) Any lawyer who uses written, recorded, or electronic solicitation 
shall maintain a file for two years showing the following: 
(1) the basis by which the lawyer knows the person solicited 
needs legal services; and 
(2) the factual basis for any statements made in the written, 
recorded, or electronic communication. 
(d) Every written, recorded or electronic communication from a 
lawyer soliciting professional employment from anyone known to be 
in need of legal services in a particular matter, and with whom the 
lawyer has no family, close personal or prior professional relationship, 
shall conform to Rules 7.1 and 7.2 and, in addition, must conform to 
the following provisions:
(1) The words "ADVERTISING MATERIAL," printed in 
capital letters and in prominent type, shall appear on the front of 
the outside envelope and on the front of each page of the 
material. Every such recorded or electronic communication 
shall clearly state both at the beginning and at the end that the 
communication is an advertisement.  If the solicitation is made
by computer, including, but not limited to, electronic mail, the 
words "ADVERTISING MATERIAL," printed in capital letters 
and in prominent type, shall appear in any subject line of the 
message and at the beginning and end of the communication. 
(2) Each solicitation must include the following statements: 
(A) "You may wish to consult your lawyer or another 
lawyer instead of me (us). You may obtain information 
about other lawyers by consulting directories, seeking the 
advice of others, or calling the South Carolina Bar 
Lawyer Referral Service at 799-7100 in Columbia or toll 
free at 1-800-868-2284. If you have already engaged a 
lawyer in connection with the legal matter referred to in 
this communication, you should direct any questions you 
have to that lawyer" and 
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 (B) "The exact nature of your legal situation will depend 
on many facts not known to me (us) at this time. You 
should understand that the advice and information in this 
communication is general and that your own situation 
may vary." 
Where the solicitation is written, the above statements must be 
in a type no smaller than that used in the body of the 
communication. 
(3) Each solicitation must include the following statement: 
"ANY COMPLAINTS ABOUT THIS COMMUNICATION 
OR THE REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY LAWYER MAY BE 
DIRECTED TO THE COMMISSION ON LAWYER 
CONDUCT, 1220 SENATE STREET, SUITE 305, 
COLUMBIA, SOUTH CAROLINA 29201 – TELEPHONE 
NUMBER 803-734-2037." Where the solicitation is written, 
this statement must be printed in capital letters and in a size no 
smaller than that used in the body of the communication. 
(e) Written communications mailed to the target of the solicitation 
shall be sent only by regular U.S. mail, not by registered mail or other 
forms of restricted or certified delivery. 
(f) Written communications mailed to the target of the solicitation 
shall not be made to resemble legal pleadings or other legal 
documents. 
(g) Any written communication prompted by a specific occurrence 
involving or affecting the intended recipient of the communication or 
a family member shall disclose how the lawyer obtained the 
information prompting the communication. 
(h) A written communication seeking employment by the target of the 
solicitation in a specific matter shall not reveal on the envelope, or on 
the outside of a self mailing brochure or pamphlet, the nature of the 
client's legal problem. 
(i) If a lawyer reasonably believes that a lawyer other than the lawyer 
whose name or signature appears on the communication will likely be 
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 the lawyer who primarily handles the case or matter, or that the case 
or matter will be referred to another lawyer or law firm, any written 
communication concerning a specific matter shall include a statement 
so advising the potential client. 
(j) Notwithstanding the prohibitions in paragraph (a), a lawyer may 
participate with a prepaid or group legal service plan operated by an 
organization not owned or directed by the lawyer that uses in person 
or telephone contact to solicit memberships or subscriptions for the 
plan from persons who are not known to need legal services in a 
particular matter covered by the plan. A lawyer may participate with a 
prepaid or group legal service plan only if the plan is established in 
compliance with all statutory and regulatory requirements imposed 
upon such plans under South Carolina law. Lawyers who participate 
in a legal service plan must make reasonable efforts to assure that the 
plan sponsors are in compliance with Rules 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3(b). 
Comment 
[1] A solicitation is a targeted communication initiated by the lawyer 
that is directed to a specific person and that offers to provide, or can 
reasonably be understood as offering to provide, legal services. In 
contrast, a lawyer's communication typically does not constitute a 
solicitation if it is directed to the general public, such as through a 
billboard, an Internet banner advertisement, a website or a television 
commercial, or if it is in response to a request for information or is 
automatically generated in response to Internet searches. For example, 
advertisements that are automatically generated in response to an 
Internet search are not solicitations. Because those advertisements are 
generated in response to Internet-based research, they are more 
analogous to a lawyer's response to a request for information (which is 
not a solicitation) than an unsolicited and targeted letter to a person 
who is known to be in need of a particular legal service (which is a 
solicitation). 
[2] There is a potential for abuse when a solicitation involves direct in 
person or live telephone or real time electronic contact by a lawyer 
with someone known to need legal services. These forms of contact 
subject a person to the private importuning of the trained advocate in a 
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direct interpersonal encounter. The person, who may already feel 
overwhelmed by the circumstances giving rise to the need for legal 
services, may find it difficult to fully evaluate all available
alternatives with reasoned judgment and appropriate self interest in 
the face of the lawyer's presence and insistence upon being retained 
immediately. The situation is fraught with the possibility of undue 
influence, intimidation, and overreaching. 
[3] The use of general advertising and written, recorded or electronic 
communications to transmit information from lawyer to the public, 
rather than direct in person, live telephone or real time electronic 
contact, will help to assure that the information flows cleanly as well 
as freely. The contents of advertisements and communications 
permitted under Rule 7.2 can be permanently recorded so that they 
cannot be disputed and may be shared with others who know the 
lawyer. This potential for informal review is itself likely to help guard 
against statements and claims that might constitute false, misleading, 
deceptive, or unfair communications, in violation of Rule 7.1. The 
contents of direct in person, live telephone or real time electronic 
contact can be disputed and may not be subject to third party scrutiny. 
Consequently, they are much more likely to approach, and 
occasionally cross, the dividing line between accurate representations 
and those that are false and misleading. 
[4] There is far less likelihood that a lawyer would engage in abusive 
practices against a former client, or a person with whom the lawyer 
has a close personal or family relationship, or in situations in which 
the lawyer is motivated by considerations other than the lawyer's 
pecuniary gain. Nor is there a serious potential for abuse when the 
person contacted is a lawyer. Consequently, the general prohibition in 
Rule 7.3(a) and the requirements of Rule 7.3(d) are not applicable in 
those situations. Also, paragraph (a) is not intended to prohibit a 
lawyer from participating in constitutionally protected activities of
public or charitable legal service organizations or bona fide political, 
social, civic, fraternal, employee or trade organizations whose
purposes include providing or recommending legal services to their 
members or beneficiaries. 
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[5] But even permitted forms of solicitation can be abused. Thus, any 
solicitation which contains information which is false, misleading, 
deceptive or unfair within the meaning of Rule 7.1; which involves 
coercion, duress, harassment, fraud, overreaching, intimidation or 
undue influence within the meaning of Rule 7.3(b)(2); which involves 
contact with someone who has made known to the lawyer a desire not 
to be solicited by the lawyer within the meaning of Rule 7.3(b)(1); 
which involves contact with a person the lawyer reasonably should
know is represented by another lawyer in the matter; or which 
involves contact with someone the lawyer reasonably should know is 
physically, emotionally or mentally incapable of exercising reasonable 
judgment in choosing a lawyer under Rule 7.3(b)(5) is prohibited. 
Moreover, if after sending a letter or other communication as 
permitted by Rule 7.2, the lawyer receives no response, any further 
effort to communicate with the recipient of the communication may 
violate the provisions of Rule 7.3(b).
[6] The public views direct solicitation in the immediate wake of an 
accident as an intrusion on the personal privacy and tranquility of 
citizens. The 30-day restriction in paragraph (b)(3) is meant to 
forestall the outrage and irritation with the legal profession 
engendered by crass commercial intrusion by attorneys upon a 
citizen's personal grief in a time of trauma. The rule is limited to a 
brief period, and lawyer advertising permitted under Rule 7.2 offers 
alternative means of conveying necessary information about the need 
for legal services and the qualifications of available lawyers and law 
firms to those who may be in need of legal services without subjecting 
the target of the solicitation to direct persuasion that may overwhelm 
their judgment. 
[7] This Rule is not intended to prohibit a lawyer from contacting 
representatives of organizations or groups that may be interested in 
establishing a group or prepaid legal plan for their members, insureds,
beneficiaries or other third parties for the purpose of informing such 
entities of the availability of and details concerning the plan or 
arrangement which the lawyer or lawyer's firm is willing to offer. This 
form of communication is not directed to a prospective client. Rather, 
it is usually addressed to an individual acting in a fiduciary capacity 
seeking a supplier of legal services for others who may, if they 
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choose, become prospective clients of the lawyer. Under these 
circumstances, the activity which the lawyer undertakes in 
communicating with such representatives and the type of information 
transmitted to the individual are functionally similar to and serve the 
same purpose as advertising permitted under Rule 7.2. 
[8] The requirement in Rule 7.3(d) that certain communications be 
marked "Advertising Material" does not apply to communications sent 
in response to requests of potential clients or their spokespersons or 
sponsors. General announcements by lawyers, including changes in 
personnel or office location, do not constitute communications 
soliciting professional employment from a client known to be in need 
of legal services within the meaning of this Rule. 
[9] Requiring communications to be marked as advertisements sent 
only by regular U.S. mail and prohibiting communications from 
resembling legal documents is designed to allow the recipient to 
choose whether or not to read the solicitation without fear of legal 
repercussions. In addition, the lawyer or law firm should reveal the 
source of information used to determine that the recipient has a 
potential legal problem. Disclosure of this information source will 
help the recipient understand the extent of knowledge the lawyer or 
law firm has regarding the recipient's particular situation and will 
avoid misleading the recipient into believing that the lawyer has 
particularized knowledge about the recipient's matter if the lawyer 
does not. 
[10] Paragraph (j) of this Rule permits a lawyer to participate with an 
organization which uses personal contact to solicit members for its 
group or prepaid legal service plan, provided that the personal contact 
is not undertaken by any lawyer who would be a provider of legal 
services through the plan. The organization referred to in paragraph (j) 
must not be owned by or directed, whether as manager or otherwise, 
by any lawyer or law firm that participates in the plan. For example, 
paragraph (j) would not permit a lawyer to create an organization 
controlled directly or indirectly by the lawyer and use the organization 
for the in person or telephone solicitation of legal employment of the 
lawyer through memberships in the plan or otherwise. The 
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communication permitted by these organizations also must not be
directed to a person known to need legal services in a particular 
matter, but is to be designed to inform potential plan members 
generally of another means of affordable legal services. 
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